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SECTION 1983 LITIGATION- SUPREME COURT
DEVELOPMENTS
Martin A. Schwartz*
Thank you Leon, Good morning. Section 1983' is the vehicle
that allows individuals to enforce their federal constitutional rights
against state government, municipal government, state officials,
local officials and other state actors. Section 1983 litigation
involves a battle; it is a battle between the individual on the one
hand, and the government on the other. It is obviously a very
important battle, a battle that takes place very frequently. The last
statistic I saw indicated that there were some fifty thousand Section
1983 cases filed each year.2
I am convinced that the United States Supreme Court
understands the importance of Section 1983. During the last
twenty years, the Court has given an extraordinary amount of
attention to the Section 1983 remedy. This was also true during
the last term.
I have grouped the Section 1983 cases, decided by the Court last
term, into four areas. One area dealt with the constitutional rights
*Professor Martin A. Schwartz is highly accomplished in the field of § 1993
litigation and, among other things authored a leading treatise entitled Section
1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (3d ed. 1997), Section 1983 Litigation:
Federal Evidence (3d ed. 1999) and with Judge George C. Pratt Section 1983
Litigation: Jury Instructions (1999). In addition, Professor Schwartz is the
author of a bi-monthly column in the New York Law Journal, entitled "Public
Interest Law." Professor Schwartz has also been the co-chair of the Practicing
Law Institute annual program on §1983 litigation for over fifteen years.
The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Faith Levine in the
preparation of this article.
142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This section provides in part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. See generally IA, lB, IC MARTIN A. SCHIVARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 1997).
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that are enforceable under Section 1983. The court decided cases
involving procedural due process,' substantive due process,4 and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
There wer elso maor.i ns xdealing with state action,6 the
right to a jury trial,7 and an important decision dealing with
qualified immunity.8
I. Constitutional Rights Enforceable Under Section 1983
a) Procedural Due Process
Let me start with the cases involving the constitutional rights
enforceable under Section 1983. The Court decided a procedural
due process case called City of West Covina v. Perkins.9 In
Perkins, the police seized property from Mr. Perkins' home in the
course of executing a search warrant." After seizing the property,
the police left a notice."
Mr. Perkins came home and got a notice, "To whom it may
concern." What I am going to tell you is a bit embellished, but
substantially correct. The notice in effect said, "Guess what? We
had a search warrant, we were here, and we took some of your
property." If you want to know what we took, there is a list of
property annexed, and if you don't like it, here are the names of
two detectives you can call."
The issue for the Court was whether the police, when they seize
property pursuant to a search warrant, were required to give the
3 City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999).
4 Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292 (1999).
5 Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
6 American Manufactures Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977, 989
(1999).7City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
8 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 143 (1999).
9 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999).
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property owner notice of the available remedies for recovering that
property. 4 It is a procedural due process notice issue.
The Ninth Circuit held that procedural due process did require
such notice. 5 The Court granted certiorari, and statistically, you
can almost tell what the result is going to be. When the Ninth
Circuit rules for the individual and against the government, the
United States Supreme Court almost automatically reverses. Here
it was not only a reversal, but also a unanimous reversal.
The Court held that the only notice that the police were required
to provide, was the notice the police provided a notification that
the police had seized property. 6 In terms of the available remedies
for recovering the property, the Court held that notice of the
remedies was adequate because the remedies were set forth in a
published source. 7
What is a published source? It could be a statute, ordinance, a
regulation, or even case law. As long as the remedies are in some
type of published source, there is no requirement that the police
give the individual notice of the available remedies."
The theory is that the individual can simply, and I am saying that
tongue in cheek, turn to these published sources and learn what the
available remedies are. While the Court did not say so in many.
words, this must mean that the individual can figure out what his
or her remedy is, what the statute of limitations might be, tolling
provisions, whom to sue, in which court, what the filing fees are,
and so forth.
14 id.
15 Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1997).
16 City of West Covina, 119 S. Ct. at 681-82.
17 Id The court found that the:
[I]ndividualized notice that the officers have taken the property is
necessary in a case such as the one before us because the property owner
would have no other reasonable means of ascertaining who was
responsible for his loss. No similar rational justifies requiring
individualized notice of state-law remedies which, like those at issue
here, are established by published, generally available state statutes and
case law. Once the property owner is informed that his property has been
seized, he can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial
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To the United States Supreme Court this is really no big deal. If
property owners want to know the remedies, they simply look up
the statute, ordinance, or case law and figure out what to do.
Under Perkins, the only time that the police have to give notice
.ofthe available remedies is when the romedies are not set forth in
some published source, or if the remedies are "arcane. '"'9
What if the remedies are set forth in an arcane published source?
I am not really sure what the court contemplates here. I think the
idea is that if you can look up the remedies, that is good enough;
the government does not have to tell you about them.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court in Perkins relied upon a
line of Supreme Court decisions known as the Parratt v. Taylor 0
line of cases. Under this line of cases, when the government takes
your property or deprives you of a liberty interest, as a result of
random and unauthorized conduct by a public official, procedural
due process is satisfied if the state gives you an adequate post-
deprivation judicial remedy.2'
If the deprivation of property or liberty is brought about as a
result of random or unauthorized official conduct, it is not feasible
for the government to give individuals prior hearings because
nobody can predict when there will be a random and unauthorized
deprivation of liberty or property. So the best the government can
do is give the individual a post-deprivation hearing, which may
consist of a post-deprivation judicial remedy.
In Perkins, the Court stated that it never held in Parratt that the
state is required to give individuals notice of available post-
deprivation judicial remedies."
That is true enough, but the Supreme Court never held in those
cases that the state was not required to give individuals notice of
available remedies. The most accurate assessment of the state of
the law before Perkins was that this was an open issue, but it is not
anymore.
I think Perkins might make some sense if individuals seeking to
recover property, which was seized by the police, are mainly law
school graduates and attorneys who can figure out what their
'9 Id. at 682.
20451 U.S. 527 (1981).
21 Id. at 540.
22 119 S. Ct. at 683.
210 [Vol 16
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judicial remedies are. However, I do not think that is the case at
all.
Perkins represents not only a very stingy view of procedural due
process, but a very unrealistic view. If you think about it, are
individuals who had their property seized by the police really
going to be able to go to the statutes and the ordinances and look
up the case law to figure out what their remedies are? That is not
realistic. On the other hand, couldn't the police simply add this
information to the form notice that the police already left when
they seized the property?
The balancing of interests in this situation clearly favors the
individual. This is a unanimous decision by the United States
Supreme Court, but it is a unanimous decision that is insensitive to
the actual plight of individuals who seek to recover property from
the police.
b) Substantive Due Process
Let me move to substantive due process; the second type of
constitutional right that the Supreme Court dealt with. The case is
Conn v. Gabbert.' Remember the homicide prosecution against.
the Menendez brothers in California? This Section 1983 case grew
out of that criminal prosecution.
The District Attorney in California had learned that Lyle
Menendez had a girlfriend, Tracey Baker, and that he had written a
letter to her.24 The District Attorney suspected that Lyle Menendez
wrote his girlfriend that if she were called to testify at trial, she
should lie. So, obviously the District Attorney wanted that letter.
The District Attorney subpoenaed Ms. Baker to testify before the
grand jury and asked her to produce the letter. Ms. Baker in turn
told the District Attorney that the letter had been turned over to her
attorney, Paul Gabbert.
26
Ms. Baker appeared before the grand jury to testify. While she
was testifying the prosecutor, who had secured a search warrant,
2' 119 S. Ct. 1292 (1999).
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searched attorney Mr. Gabbert in a separate room. 7 Mr. Gabbert
produced the letter and subsequently brought a Section 1983
action.
Mr. Gabbert's claim was that the government search, while his
client was ,testifying before the, grand jury, prevented his client
from consulting with him.2" He argued that the search violated his
substantive due process right to practice his profession. 9
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Gabbert. °
Not only did -the circuit court agree with-him; but it held that the
government violated Mr. Gabbert's clearly established
constitutional right to practice his profession."
Therefore, Conn is yet another Ninth Circuit decision in favor of
the individual, and I bet you can figure out what happened in the
United States Supreme Court. It unanimously reversed the ruling
on the substantive due process claim.
One of the things that is interesting about the Supreme Court's
opinion is that the Court recognized that its precedent established a
generalized substantive due process right to practice a profession. 2
But the Court said that in those cases, what was at stake was a
complete denial of the right to practice one's profession."
Even in the context of the state saying a person can not practice a
particular profession, the Court has upheld reasonable regulations
of the right to practice the profession.
By contrast, Conn involved what the Court referred to as a brief
interruption of the ability to practice one's profession. 4 The type
of brief interruption that occurred in Conn was inevitable. 5
Are we going to have constitutional claims every time an
attorney, a doctor, or somebody else involved in a particular
profession is temporarily interrupted by some type of government
27 id.
28 Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1294.
29id.
30 See Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1997).
31 Id.
32 Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1294-95 (1999); see Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Trvax v. Reich, 239 U.S. 33
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action? The holding in Conn is that these types of temporary
interruptions with one's right to practice a profession, simply are
not of constitutional dimension: they do not give rise violations of
substantive due process.
c) Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
The third right that the Court dealt with is the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In teaching
constitutional law, there are a lot of things that we are not always
confident about. However, the one thing we were confident about
is telling students, "Do not worry about the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It does not mean
anything. It is a dead letter and has been relied upon by the United
States Supreme Court maybe two or three times." Of all issues, this
is the one thing we thought we knew. Now it turns out that even
that is not so. We can not even be confident on that score anymore
because last term, the Court decided Saenz v. Roe," which, in
effect, resurrected the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
In Saenz, the Court relied upon the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a California law
that provided that poor families who migrated into California were
eligible to receive only the lower amount of public assistance they
would have been eligible for in the state from which they came.39
During that first year these families were not eligible for the higher
amounts of public assistance that are available to long-term
residents of California.'
36 u.s. CONST. art. IV, § 2 cl. 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens of the several States." Id.
37 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
38 Id. at 1526-27. The Court stated that a newly arrived citizen of a state is
entitled to the "same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the
same state." Id. at 1526.39 id. at 1521.
40 Id. at 1522. Each of the three plaintiffs in the Saenz case alleged that her
monthly AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependant Children) grant for the first
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The Court distinguished Saenz from Shapiro v. Thompson.4 In
Shapiro, the United States Supreme Court held that a state imposed
one-year durational residency requirement for public assistance
eligibility was unconstitutional because it violated the
constitutionally protected right of interstate travel.42 Under these
state laws before the Court in Shapiro, families suffered a
complete denial of public assistance during the one-year.43 In
Saenz, the California law was a little different. The family was not
totally denied public .assistanee, but was limited, to the amount it
was eligible to receive in the state from which it came.
I think that the result in Saenz followed logically from the
decision in Shapiro. However, what took the legal community and
the media by total surprise, was the Supreme Court's reliance upon
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Being what some of my friends have called me, a Section 1983
junkie, I looked back at the lower court decisions in the Saenz case.
Because the Supreme Court in Saenz did not mention Section
1983, I was curious if this case was brought under Section 1983.
The answer is that it was.' This raises the question whether the
decision in Saenz will usher in a whole new era, a whole new wave
of Section 1983 litigation under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Currently, there is no way
to know the answer to that question.
There is no way to know whether Saenz is a one-shot decision,
or whether there will be a lot of litigation and developments based
on the decision in Saenz.
substantially lower under the new California statute. Specifically, "the former
residents of Louisiana and Oklahoma would receive $190 and $341 respectively
for a family of three even though the full California grant was $641; the former
resident of Colorado, who had just one child, was limited to $280 a month as
opposed to the full California grant of $504 for a family of two." Id.
, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
42 Id. at 634; see also, U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (stating "The
constitutional right to travel from one state to another...occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been
firmly established and repeatedly recognized.) Id. at 630.
43 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 623-25.
" Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998).
214 [Vol 16
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Let me come to the second main subject area, state action. State
action is a threshold question for making out a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment: no state action means no Fourteenth
Amendment claim." The issue is if you have a private party who
is involved with state and local government; does that involvement
justify treating the private party as an arm of the stateV* If the
private party is not treated as an arm of the state, one cannot assert
a Fourteenth Amendment claim against that party.
4 7
The Warren Court took a very expansive view of state action. 8
When we look back on the Warren Court, its view seems quite
consistent with the critical mission of the Court of eradicating:
much racial discrimination in society as possible.
Since the Warren Court era came to an end, the Burger Court
and the Rehnquist Court have consistently taken a narrow view of
state action. This seems consistent with the mission, or one of the
missions of the present Supreme Court, giving protection to big
business, protection in the sense of being free of the restraints of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is becoming more of an important issue today as we see
increasing privatization of what used to be governmental services.
So, the question is whether an entity involved in carrying, for
example a medical assistance program or private prison, is engaged
in state action.
The narrow view of state action was followed last term in
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan.49
American Manufacturers dealt with a Pennsylvania Workers'
Compensation program that was administered partly by private
insurance companies.
45 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
46 See, e.g. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
47 See, eg. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
48 See Michael Finch, Governmental Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: A
Theory Reconsidered, 57 MONT. LAW REV. 1 (1996). See, eg. Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
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The Court held that when private insurance companies decide to
withhold or suspend Workers' Compensation benefits for medical
expenses, pending review by a utilization review committee, the
decision by the insurance company to suspend payment of benefits
.does not constitute state action) 0 The Court unanimously found no
state action.5'
In coming to that conclusion, the Court referred to three state
action doctrines. One of the doctrines is called the close-nexus
document, or sufficiently close-nexus doctrine. 2 For there to be
state action under this doctrine, the government must have either
coerced or significantly encouraged the private party's conduct.
The Supreme Court said, perhaps Pennsylvania encouraged private
insurance companies to withhold payments pending review by the
utilization review committees, but there was no significant
encouragement, so that took care of that theory.53
The fact that the insurance companies took advantage of a
dispute resolution mechanism established by the state, was not
enough to constitute state action.' I think that is right because to
hold otherwise would mean that there would be state action any
time a private litigant used a dispute resolution mechanism
established by the state. The mere fact that the private entity
makes use of a government dispute resolution mechanism does not
turn the private entity into an arm of the state.
The second doctrine, the public function doctrine,"5 requires a
showing that the private party carried out a function that was
historically, traditionally, and here is the key word, exclusively
governmental in nature.56 The function has to be not only
SoAmerican Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. at 985-86.
5 1 id.
52 Id. at 986. "Whether such a 'close nexus' exists .... depends on whether the
state has exercised coercive power, or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to
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historically and traditionally governmental in nature, but it has to
be exclusively a governmental function."
That test is almost impossible to satisfy because how can a party
ever show that a function is an exclusive governmental function?
The Court had no trouble concluding that the insurance companies
were not carrying out an exclusive governmental function."3
The third state action test, the joint participation test, sometimes
referred to as the joint action test, requires some type of agreement
or conspiratorial action between the government and the private
sector. That was not present either.59
One of the interesting things about American Mamfacturers is
that there is a fourth state action test that courts commonly rely
upon in analyzing state action issues called the symbiotic
relationship test. That test derives from a Warren Court state
action decision, Burton v. the Wilmington Parking Society.'
However, in American Manufacturers, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cast Burton aside by saying that it was one of our "early state
action decisions" containing "vague state action language," as if to
say that precedent really does not have very much weight anymore
and we are not going to trouble ourselves with that one.'
One of the most interesting things about American
Manufacturers, especially since it carries forth the narrow
conception of state action, is that in the course of rejecting all of
the plaintiffs' state action arguments, almost as an aside, the Chief
Justice said that the decision of the Utilization Review Committee
would be state action.'
That comment took me by surprise. First of all, there was no
reason for the gratuity. In addition, there was no explanation for
the conclusion. I could only surmise that what the Chief Justice
was thinking about was probably the public function doctrine. By
57 Id. at 988 (stating that Pennsylvania's recognition of "an insurer's
traditionally private prerogative to withhold payment, then [its restriction of] it,
and [current restoration], cannot constitute the delegation of a traditionally
exclusive public function").58 id.
59 Id. at 988.
60 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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describing the decision of the Utilization Review Committee as
being like the decision of any judicial official, it sounds like he
was thinking about the public function doctrine. But how can it be
said that dispute resolution is an exclusive governmental
function?63
This is going to be an interesting issue to watch out for in the
future. It may be that if this issue comes back to the United States
Supreme Court, the Court might say, that its remark in American
Mcnufacturers was just dictum, made off the cuff, and it certainly
was not a holding.
III. Right to Trial by Jury
Let me get to the third area, the right to a jury trial in Section
1983 actions. The case before the United States Supreme Court
was City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes." The question was
whether there is a right to trial by jury on a regulatory takings
claim.65
In this case, the developer had submitted an application to the
city to develop its property.' The city said that the proposed
development was too big, scale it down.67 The indication was, if
the developer scaled down the proposed project and came back, the
city would look more favorably upon it. So, what did the
developer do? He scaled down the development and submitted
another application.6" What did the city say? Still too big, scale it
down some more. 9
63 See Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that dispute
resolutions is not exclusively a governmental function).
64 119 S. Ct 1624 (1999).
65 Id. at 1637.
66Id. at 1632.67 id.
6 8 id.
69 Id. Beginning in 1983 the landowners submitted several proposals to
"develop the property in conformance with the city's zoning and general plan
requirements." The landowners limited their proposal to 344 residential units
for the entire parcel although the zoning requirement allowed for more than
1000 units. After complying with the city plann'"i Commission's repeated
requests to scale down the development to 263 units in 1982, 224 units in
218 [Vol 16
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This went on for five years and there were nineteen
applications.7" After nineteen applications in five years, there was
still no permission granted to develop the property. So, the
developer got the idea that the city probably was not going to allow
development of the property."'
One of the big issues in takings law is ripeness;72 but here the
attorney for the developer concluded that this claim must be ripe.
The developer, after all, made nineteen applications to develop this
property. So the developer sued under Section 1983. The district
judge submitted the takings claim to the jury, and that is where it
gets interesting.
The jury came back with a verdict for the developer: 1.45
million dollars compensatory damages. 3  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed,74 so at that point the developer probably got pretty
nervous. The case went to the United States Supreme Court, and in
a very rare event, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals."
The issue for the United States Supreme Court was whether
there is a right to a trial by jury on a Section 1983 regulatory
takings claim.76 One of the interesting things about this issue is
that the original version of Section 1983 goes back to 1871 and thiq
is the first time the United States Supreme Court has determined
that there is a right to a jury trial in a Section 1983 action.'
The Supreme Court could not find a right to a jury trial in the
language of Section 1983.78 Nothing in the text of Section 1983
supports a statutory right to a trial by jury. However, the Court
1983,and 190 units in 1984, the landowner's proposals were consistently
rejected. In late 1984, the council finally approved one of the site plans under a
conditional permit. However, in 1986, two months before the permit was to
expire, the council denied the landowners final plans for development. Id.
70 Id. at 1633.71 id.
' Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985).
73 City of Monterey, 119 S. Ct at 1634.
74 Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996).
75 City of Monterey, 119 S. Ct atI645.
76 id.
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held that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to a jury
trial.' The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial
in civil cases where the amount in controversy is at least twenty
dollars. These days, it is not hard to show twenty dollars is at
stake.
The -Courfo d -that -a -regulatory takings 'claim. seeking just
compensation is analogous to a claim for compensatory damages."
A claim for compensatory damages is an action at law within the
meaning of the Seventh Amendment.8
The Court's recognition of the jury trial right is obviously an
important holding in and of itself. But the next part of the decision
is maybe even more important, and even more interesting. Once
the Court held that there is a right to a trial by jury on a Section
1983 regulatory takings claim, the next question becomes which
issues should be submitted to the jury? In other words, what are
questions of law for the court and what are questions of fact for the
jury?
Remember, the judge in this case submitted the regulatory
takings claim to the jury." The Supreme Court held that because
the developer's regulatory takings claim was an essentially fact-
based claim, dependent upon the resolution of disputed factual
issues, there was no error in submitting it to the jury. 3
There were actually two questions submitted to the jury. First,
the jury was instructed that it could find a taking if it found that the
developer was deprived of all economically viable use of the
property.' 4 On that issue, the United States Supreme Court did not
79 d.
'0 Id. at 1639. "As the name suggests.. . just compensation is, like ordinary
money damages, a compensatory remedy." Id.
81 Id.
8 2 Id. at 1633. The Court concluded, "The District Court determined, over the
city's objections, to submit Del Monte Dunes' taking and equal protection
claims to a jury but to reserve the substantive due process for decision by the
court." Id.
83 Id. at 1643. The Court held, "that the issue whether a landowner has been
deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a predominantly
factual question . . . in actions of law otherwise within the purview of the
Seventh Amendment, this question is for the jury." IL
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have much difficulty. The Court said that question is essentially a
factual question, therefore, it was proper to submit it to the jury.
The other issue submitted to the jury is a little more debatable.
The jury was told that it could find that there was a regulatory
taking if the plaintiff demonstrated that the governmental action,
denying development of the property, failed to substantially
advance a legitimate governmental interest.'
That is a little sticky. Think about this issue, does the
government action substantially advance a legitimate governmental
interest? There are obviously legal aspects to that question. In
fact, the Supreme Court in analyzing this, was more tentative than
on the other issue submitted to the jury.
The Supreme Court said that this issue is probably best described
as a mixed issue of law and fact, therefore the district court did not
err in submitting it to the jury.'
The district court did inform the jury about the range of
potentially permissible legitimate governmental interests." The
jury was not asked to make that type of legal evaluation, rather it
was asked to determine whether the denial of development
substantially advanced one of the legitimate governmental interests
articulated in the instruction.'
85 City of Monterey, 119 S. Ct at 1634. The district court gave the following
jury instruction:
"The regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially
advance a legitimate public purpose if the action bears a
reasonable relationship to that objective. Now, if the
preponderance of the evidence establishes that there was no
reasonable relationship between the city's denial of the..
.proposal and legitimate public purpose, you should find in favor
of the plaintiff. If you find that there existed a reasonable
relationship between the city's decision and a legitimate public
purpose, you should find in favor of the city. As long as the
regulatory action by the city substantially advances their
legitimate public purpose,.. .its underlying motives and reasons
are not to be inquired into."
Id.
6Id.
87 Id. The range of permissible legitimate governmental interests are:
"protecting the environment, preserving open space agriculture, protecting the
health and safety of its citizens, and regulating the quality of the community by
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I think that the instructions, even though they were upheld by the
United States Supreme Court, are a little unusual. For one thing,
they defined "substantially advanced legitimate governmental
interests" by saying that the government action has to be
"reasonably related" to a legitimate governmental interest. If so, is
there no need for phrase "substantially advance?" I think that just
confuses everything. "
I also question the second part of the jury instruction. A
regulatory taking comes -about only if the extent of the deprivation
of the property interest outweighs the government's interest.8 9
Therefore, the instruction does not seem to be a correct statement
of the law. But the United States Supreme Court said it is
consistent with its decisional law.9" There was not a lot of analysis
there, but some things about the Court's decision maybe should not
be taken at face value.
Let me make two other points about this case. Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion is a very important concurring opinion, because
he said that the Court should not have rendered a narrow decision
dealing with the right to a trial by jury on a Section 1983
regulatory takings claim; the Court should have held that there is a
right to a jury trial on any Section 1983 claim seeking monetary
relief.9
I think Justice Scalia is right on that point, there was no reason to
limit the jury trial right to a particular type of Section 1983
monetary claim. I think that this conclusion is supported by
language in the majority opinion.
The second point is that the decision reflects a conservative,
moderate-liberal split with the more conservative justices in the
majority.
The speculation is that the conservative justices voted for a right
to a jury trial in these cases because part ofjudicial conservatism in
the United States Supreme Court is to protect property. The
thinking might be that the one way to protect property is to put
89 See, e.g. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York ('ty, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (192 ).
90 See Williamson County Regional Planning Co) m'n. v. Hamilton Bank of
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these takings issues in the hands of jurors who are likely to award
greater amounts ofjust compensation than judges in bench trials.
IV. Qualified Immunity
My last issue is qualified immunity. I think qualified immunity
is one of the most important issues in Section 1983 litigation.
Most officials who are sued for monetary damages under Section
1983 are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.2 The
key issue is, did the official violate clearly established federal
law?93 This defense gets played out, you can have a public official
who acted in an unconstitutional manner, but the constitutional law
was not clearly established at the time the official acted, the
official will be protected against monetary liability.
Only officials who violate clearly established constitutional law
are held personally liable for damages. It is a very potent defense
and rather extraordinary in the sense that it is not just a defense
from liability, but also a defense from the burdens of having to
defend the case at all. This defense protects the official from
having to go to trial, maybe even from discovery.' That is
extraordinary! In my years as a legal services attorney, we
understood that immunities were part of the ball game, part of
litigation. However, immunities always were thought of as
immunities from liability. We never thought that public officials
would ever have an immunity that says they do not even have to
defend a case. It is almost like that line from Eric Segal's Love
Story, "Love means never have to say you are sorry." The official
does not even have to defend the case on the merits.
One of the big questions under this immunity is how to figure
out whether the federal law was clearly established. The Supreme
Court spoke to that issue last term in Wilson v. Layne.'5
92 Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
93 See, eg. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); See also Conn v.
Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999). The Court established that a court, in
evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, "must first determine whether that
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Id.
Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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Professor Hellerstein will speak to you later about the Fourth
Amendment holding in Wilson. Wilson dealt with so-called media
tag-alongs, or ride-alongs, where law enforcement officers invited
the television crew to come along and observe the enforcement of
-an.arrest ,waaan t4ia;lhome. 6 - The police told the media, "Why
don't you come along and observe and even make a videotape of
the execution of the warrant.
97
The United States Supreme Court held unanimously that the
police action, in inviting the media into the home, constituted an
unreasonable execution of the warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 98 The Court went on to hold, by an eight to one vote,
that since 1992, when the warrant was executed, the media ride-
alongs were not clearly unconstitutional. So the plaintiff was
denied a recovery. 9
How did the court reach that conclusion? It found that in 1992,
there was no decision of a "controlling jurisdiction" holding ride-
alongs to be unconstitutional.'"
What did the Court mean by "controlling jurisdiction"? No
decision of the United States Supreme Court, of the particular
circuit in which the case was being litigated or of the highest court
of the state had held the media tag-alongs were violative of the
96 Id. at 1694.
97 Id. The Court held that the intrusion violated the Fourth Amendment rights
of homeowners for police to bring third parties or members of the media "into
their home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third
parties in the home was not in aid of a warrant execution." Id. The Fourth
Amendment is the embodiment of "centuries-old principles of respect for the
privacy of the home, which apply where... police enter a home under the
authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in
the warrant. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were
entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth
Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to
the objectives of the authorized intrusion." Id.98 Id.
99 Id. at 1700. "Accurate media coverage of police activities serves an
important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the general principles of the
Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case violated the
Amendment.. .although media ride-alongs of one sort or another had apparently
become a common police practice, in 1992 there were no judicial opinions
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Fourth Amendment.' The absence of such controlling precedent
is a strong indicator that the law was not clearly established.
In addition, after the incident in this case, a split of authority
developed in the circuits."' This was another strong indication that
the law was not clearly established. The Court also said that the
arguments put forth by the law enforcement officers to support the
constitutionality of the media ride-alongs were not totally
frivolous." This was not an open and shut case.
The Court's analysis of qualified immunity seemed to make a
good deal of sense, but not to Justice Stevens.
Justice Stevens, dissenting from the Court's immunity holding,
in effect said, "Wait a second, I have been on the Court for a
number of years now, and years how often has the Court found that
any police action violated the Fourth Amendment? No less
unanimously so, as in this case. Doesn't the unanimous holding by
this Court in Wilson show that the law was clearly established?"
That is an interesting perspective.
He went on to say that as for the lack of controlling precedent,
sometimes the easiest cases involving the most egregious
governmental wrongdoing are not supported by precedent because
they do not always get litigated.
04
Thank you very much.
l011d.
10Id. at 1701.
103 Id. The Court reasoned that, "the state of law as to third parties
accompanying police on home entries was at best undeveloped, and it was not
unreasonable for law enforcement officers to look and rely on their formal ride-
along policies. Given such an undeveloped state of law, the officers in this case
cannot have been 'expected to predict the future course of constitutional law.'"
Id.
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